Attribute-based access control (ABAC) provides a high level of flexibility that promotes security and information sharing. ABAC policy mining algorithms have potential to significantly reduce the cost of migration to ABAC, by partially automating the development of an ABAC policy from an access control list (ACL) policy or role-based access control (RBAC) policy with accompanying attribute data. This paper presents an ABAC policy mining algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first ABAC policy mining algorithm. Our algorithm iterates over tuples in the given user-permission relation, uses selected tuples as seeds for constructing candidate rules, and attempts to generalize each candidate rule to cover additional tuples in the user-permission relation by replacing conjuncts in attribute expressions with constraints. Our algorithm attempts to improve the policy by merging and simplifying candidate rules, and then it selects the highest-quality candidate rules for inclusion in the generated policy.
INTRODUCTION
A TTRIBUTE-BASED access control (ABAC) provides a high level of flexibility that promotes security and information sharing [1] . ABAC also overcomes some of the problems associated with RBAC [2] , notably role explosion [1] , [3] . The benefits of ABAC led the federal chief information officer council to call out ABAC as a recommended access control model in the federal identity credential and access management roadmap and implementation guidance, ver. 2.0 [1] , [4] .
Manual development of RBAC policies can be time-consuming and expensive [5] . Role mining algorithms promise to drastically reduce the cost, by partially automating the development of RBAC policies [5] . Role mining is an active research area and a currently relatively small (about $70 million) but rapidly growing commercial market segment [5] . Similarly, manual development of ABAC policies can be difficult [6] and expensive [1] . ABAC policy mining algorithms have potential to reduce the cost of ABAC policy development.
The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm for ABAC policy mining. Our algorithm is formulated to mine an ABAC policy from ACLs and attribute data. It can be used to mine an ABAC policy from an RBAC policy and attribute data, by expanding the RBAC policy into ACLs, adding a "role" attribute to the attribute data (to avoid information loss), and then applying our algorithm. At a high level, our algorithm works as follows. It iterates over tuples in the given user-permission relation, uses selected tuples as seeds for constructing candidate rules, and attempts to generalize each candidate rule to cover additional tuples in the user-permission relation by replacing conjuncts in attribute expressions with constraints. After constructing candidate rules that together cover the entire user-permission relation, it attempts to improve the policy by merging and simplifying candidate rules. Finally, it selects the highest-quality candidate rules for inclusion in the generated policy. We also developed an extension of the algorithm to identify suspected noise in the input.
Section 5 presents results from evaluating the algorithm on some relatively small but non-trivial hand-written sample policies and on synthetic (i.e., pseudorandomly generated) policies. The general methodology is to start with an ABAC policy (including attribute data), generate an equivalent ACL policy from the ABAC policy, add noise (in some experiments) to the ACL policy and attribute data, run our algorithm on the resulting ACL policies and attribute data, and compare the mined ABAC policy with the original ABAC policy.
ABAC POLICY LANGUAGE
This section presents our ABAC policy language. We do not consider policy administration, since our goal is to mine a single ABAC policy from the current low-level policy. We present a specific concrete policy language, rather than a flexible framework, to simplify the exposition and evaluation of our policy mining algorithm, although our approach is general and can be adapted to other ABAC policy languages. Our ABAC policy language contains all of the common ABAC policy language constructs, except arithmetic inequalities and negation. Extending our algorithm to handle those constructs is future work. The policy language handled in this paper is already significantly more complex than policy languages handled in previous work on security policy mining.
ABAC policies refer to attributes of users and resources. Given a set U of users and a set A u of user attributes, user attribute data is represented by a function d u such that d u ðu; aÞ is the value of attribute a for user u. There is a distinguished user attribute uid that has a unique value for each user. Similarly, given a set R of resources and a set A r of resource attributes, resource attribute data is represented by a function d r such that d r ðr; aÞ is the value of attribute a for resource r. There is a distinguished resource attribute rid that has a unique value for each resource. We assume the set A u of user attributes can be partitioned into a set A u;1 of single-valued user attributes which have atomic values, and a set A u;m of multi-valued user attributes whose values are sets of atomic values. Similarly, we assume the set A r of resource attributes can be partitioned into a set A r;1 of single-valued resource attributes and a set of A r;m of multi-valued resource attributes. Let Val s be the set of possible atomic values of attributes. We assume Val s includes a distinguished value ? used to indicate that an attribute's value is unknown. The set of possible values of multi-valued attributes is Val m ¼ SetðVal s n f?gÞ [ ?, where SetðSÞ is the powerset of set S.
Attribute expressions are used to express the sets of users and resources to which a rule applies. A user-attribute expression (UAE) is a function e such that, for each user attribute a, eðaÞ is either the special value >, indicating that e imposes no constraint on the value of attribute a, or a set (interpreted as a disjunction) of possible values of a excluding ? (in other words, a subset of Val s n f?g or Val m n f?g, depending on whether a is single-valued or multi-valued). We refer to the set eðaÞ as the conjunct for attribute a. We say that expression e uses an attribute a if eðaÞ 6 ¼ >. Let attrðeÞ denote the set of attributes used by e. Let attr 1 ðeÞ and attr m ðeÞ denote the sets of single-valued and multi-valued attributes, respectively, used by e.
A user u satisfies a user-attribute expression e, denoted u e, iff ð8a 2 A u;1 : eðaÞ ¼ > _ 9v 2 eðaÞ: d u ðu; aÞ ¼ vÞ and ð8a 2 A u;m : eðaÞ ¼ > _ 9v 2 eðaÞ: d u ðu; aÞ vÞ. For multi-valued attributes, we use the condition d u ðu; aÞ v instead of d u ðu; aÞ ¼ v because elements of a multi-valued user attribute typically represent some type of capabilities of a user, so using expresses that the user has the specified capabilities and possibly more.
For example, suppose A u;1 ¼ fdept; positiong and A u;m ¼ fcoursesg. The function e 1 with e 1 ðdeptÞ ¼ fCSg and e 1 ðpositionÞ ¼ fgrad; ugradg and e 1 ðcoursesÞ ¼ ffCS101;
CS102gg is a user-attribute expression satisfied by users in the CS department who are either graduate or undergraduate students and whose courses include CS101 and CS102 (and possibly other courses).
We introduce a concrete syntax for attribute expressions, for improved readability in examples. We write a user attribute expression as a conjunction of the conjuncts not equal to >. Suppose eðaÞ 6 ¼ >. Let v ¼ eðaÞ. When a is single-valued, we write the conjunct for a as a 2 v; as syntactic sugar, if v is a singleton set fsg, we may write the conjunct as a ¼ s. When a is multi-valued, we write the conjunct for a as a 2 v (indicating that a is a superset of an element of v); as syntactic sugar, if v is a singleton set fsg, we may write the conjunct as a s. For example, the above expression e 1 may be written as dept ¼ CS^position 2 fugrad; gradgĉ ourses fCS101; CS102g. For an example that uses 2, the expression e 2 that is the same as e 1 except with e 2 ðcoursesÞ ¼ffCS101g; fCS102gg may be written as dept ¼ CS^position 2fugrad; gradg^courses 2 ffCS101g; fCS102gg, and is satisfied by graduate or undergraduate students in the CS department whose courses include either CS101 or CS102.
The meaning of a user-attribute expression e, denoted e ½ ½ U , is the set of users in U that satisfy it: e ½ ½ U ¼ fu 2
U j u eg. User attribute data is an implicit argument to e ½ ½ U . We say that e characterizes the set e ½ ½ U . A resource-attribute expression (RAE) is defined similarly, except using the set A r of resource attributes instead of the set A u of user attributes. The semantics of RAEs is defined similarly to the semantics of UAEs, except simply using equality, not , in the condition for multi-valued attributes in the definition of "satisfies", because we do not interpret elements of multi-valued resource attributes specially (e.g., as capabilities).
In ABAC policy rules, constraints are used to express relationships between users and resources. An atomic constraint is a formula f of the form a u;m a r;m , a u;m 3 a r;1 , or a u;1 ¼ a r;1 , where a u;1 2 A u;1 , a u;m 2 A u;m , a r;1 2 A r;1 , and a r;m 2 A r;m . The first two forms express that user attributes contain specified values. This is a common type of constraint, because user attributes typically represent some type of capabilities of a user. Other forms of atomic constraint are possible (e.g., a u;m a r;m ) but less common, so we leave them for future work. Let uAttrðfÞ and rAttrðfÞ refer to the user attribute and resource attribute, respectively, used in f. User u and resource r satisfy an atomic constraint f, denoted hu; ri f, if d u ðu; uAttrðfÞÞ 6 ¼ ? and d r ðu; rAttrðfÞÞ 6 ¼ ? and formula f holds when the values d u ðu; uAttrðfÞÞ and d r ðu; rAttrðfÞÞ are substituted in it.
A constraint is a set (interpreted as a conjunction) of atomic constraints. User u and resource r satisfy a constraint c, denoted hu; ri c, if they satisfy every atomic constraint in c. In examples, we write constraints as conjunctions instead of sets. For example, the constraint "specialties topics^teams 3 treatingTeam" is satisfied by user u and resource r if the user's specialties include all of the topics associated with the resource, and the set of teams associated with the user contains the treatingTeam associated with the resource.
A user-permission tuple is a tuple hu; r; oi containing a user, a resource, and an operation. This tuple means that user u has permission to perform operation o on resource r. A user-permission relation is a set of such tuples.
A rule is a tuple he u ; e r ; O; ci, where e u is a user-attribute expression, e r is a resource-attribute expression, O is a set of operations, and c is a constraint. For a rule r ¼ he u ; e r ; O; ci, let uaeðrÞ ¼ e u , raeðrÞ ¼ e r , opsðrÞ ¼ O, and conðrÞ ¼ c. For example, the rule htrue, type=task^proprietary=false, {read, request}, projects 3 project^expertise expertisei used in our project management case study can be interpreted as "A user working on a project can read and request to work on a non-proprietary task whose required areas of expertise are among his/her areas of expertise." User u, resource r, and operation o satisfy a rule r, denoted hu; r; oi r, if u uaeðrÞ^r raeðrÞ^o 2 opsðrÞ^hu; ri
conðrÞ.
An ABAC policy is a tuple hU; R; Op; A u ; A r ; d u ; d r ; Rulesi, where U, R, A u , A r , d u , and d r are as described above, Op is a set of operations, and Rules is a set of rules.
The user-permission relation induced by a rule r is r ½ ½ ¼ fhu; r; oi 2 U Â R Â Op j hu; r; oi rg. Note that U, R, d u , and d r are implicit arguments to r ½ ½ . The user-permission relation induced by a policy p with the above form is p
An access control list (ACL) policy is a tuple hU; R; Op; UP 0 i, where U is a set of users, R is a set of resources, Op is a set of operations, and UP 0 U Â R Â Op is a user-permission relation, obtained from the union of the access control lists. An ABAC policy p is consistent with an ACL policy hU; P; Op; UP 0 i if they have the same sets of users, resource, and operations and p ½ ½ ¼ UP 0 . An ABAC policy consistent with a given ACL policy can be trivially constructed, by creating a separate rule corresponding to each user-permission tuple in the ACL policy, simply using uid and rid to identify the relevant user and resource. Of course, such an ABAC policy is as verbose and hard to manage as the original ACL policy. This observation forces us to ask: among ABAC policies semantically consistent with a given ACL policy p 0 , which ones are preferable? We adopt two criteria.
One criterion is that policies that do not use the attributes uid and rid are preferable, because policies that use uid and rid are partly identity-based, not entirely attribute-based. Therefore, our definition of ABAC policy mining requires that these attributes are used only if necessary, i.e., only if every ABAC policy semantically consistent with p 0 contains rules that use them.
The other criterion is to maximize a policy quality metric. A policy quality metric is a function Q pol from ABAC policies to a totally-ordered set, such as the natural numbers. The ordering is chosen so that small values indicate high quality; this is natural for metrics based on policy size. For generality, we parameterize the policy mining problem by the policy quality metric.
The ABAC policy mining problem is: given an ACL policy p 0 ¼ hU; R; Op; UP 0 i, user attributes A u , resource attributes A r , user attribute data d u , resource attribute data d r , and a policy quality metric Q pol , find a set Rules of rules such that the ABAC policy p ¼ hU; R; Op; A u ; A r ; d u ; d r ; Rulesi that (1) is consistent with p 0 , (2) uses uid only when necessary, (3) uses rid only when necessary, and (4) has the best quality, according to Q pol , among such policies.
The policy quality metric that our algorithm aims to optimize is weighted structural complexity (WSC) [7] , a generalization of policy size. This is consistent with usability studies of access control rules, which conclude that more concise policies are more manageable [6] . Informally, the WSC of an ABAC policy is a weighted sum of the number of elements in the policy. Formally, the WSC of an ABAC policy p with rules Rules is WSCðpÞ ¼ WSCðRulesÞ, defined by where jsj is the cardinality of set s, and the w i are userspecified weights. Computational complexity. We show that the ABAC policy mining problem is NP-hard, by reducing the Edge Role Mining Problem (Edge RMP) [8] to it. NP-hardness of Edge RMP follows from Theorem 1 in [7] . The basic idea of the reduction is that an Edge RMP instance I R is translated into an ABAC policy mining problem instance I A with uid and rid as the only attributes. Given a solution p ABAC to problem instance I A , the solution to I R is constructed by interpreting each rule as a role. Details of the reduction appear in Section 8 in the Supplemental Material, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ TDSC.2014.2369048 available online.
It is easy to show that a decision-problem version of ABAC policy mining is in NP. The decision-problem version asks whether there exists an ABAC policy that meets conditions (1)-(3) in the above definition of the ABAC policy mining problem and has WSC less than or equal to a given value.
POLICY MINING ALGORITHM
Top-level pseudocode for our policy mining algorithm appears in Fig. 1 . It reflects the high-level structure described in Section 1. Functions called by the top-level pseudocode are described next. Function names hyperlink to pseudocode for the function, if it is included in the paper, otherwise to a description of the function. An example illustrating the processing of a user-permission tuple by our algorithm appears in Section 13 in the Supplemental Material, available online. For efficiency, our algorithm incorporates heuristics and is not guaranteed to generate a policy with minimal WSC.
The function addCandidateRuleðs u ; s r ; s o ; cc; uncovUP; RulesÞ in Fig. 2 first calls computeUAE to compute a userattribute expression e u that characterizes s u , then calls and computeRAE to compute a resource-attribute expression e r that characterizes s r . It then calls generalizeRuleðr; cc; uncovUP; RulesÞ to generalize the rule r ¼ he u ; e r ; s o ; ;i to r 0 and adds r 0 to candidate rule set Rules. The details of the functions called by addCandidateRule are described next.
The function computeUAEðs; UÞ computes a user-attribute expression e u that characterizes the set s of users. The conjunct for each attribute a contains the values of a for users in s, unless one of those values is ?, in which case a is unused (i.e., the conjunct for a is >). Furthermore, the conjunct for uid is removed if the resulting attribute expression still characterizes s; this step is useful because policies that are not identity-based generalize better. Similarly, computeRAEðs; RÞ computes a resource-attribute expression that characterizes the set s of resources. The attribute expressions returned by computeUAE and computeRAE might not be minimum-sized among expressions that characterize s: it is possible that some conjuncts can be removed. We defer minimization of the attribute expressions until after the call to generalizeRule (described below), because minimizing them before that would reduce opportunities to find relations between values of user attributes and resource attributes in generalizeRule.
The function candidateConstraintðr; uÞ returns a set containing all the atomic constraints that hold between resource r and user u. Pseudocode for candidateConstraint is straightforward and omitted.
A rule r 0 is valid if r 0 ½ ½ UP 0 . The function generalizeRuleðr; cc; uncovUP; RulesÞ in Fig. 3 attempts to generalize rule r by adding some of the atomic constraints f in cc to r and eliminating the conjuncts of the user attribute expression and the resource attribute expression corresponding to the attributes used in f, i.e., mapping those attributes to >. If the resulting rule is invalid, the function attempts a more conservative generalization by eliminating only one of those conjuncts, keeping the other. We call a rule obtained in this way a generalization of r. Such a rule is more general than r in the sense that it refers to relationships instead of specific values. Also, the user-permission relation induced by a generalization of r is a superset of the user-permission relation induced by r.
If there are no valid generalizations of r, generalizeRule ðr; cc; uncovUP; RulesÞ returns r. If there is a valid generalization of r, generalizeRuleðr; cc; uncovUP; RulesÞ returns the generalization r 0 of r with the best quality according to a given rule quality metric. Note that r 0 may cover tuples that are already covered (i.e., are in UP); in other words, our algorithm can generate policies containing rules whose meanings overlap. A rule quality metric is a function Q rul ðr; UPÞ that maps a rule r to a totally-ordered set, with the ordering chosen so that larger values indicate high quality. The second argument UP is a set of user-permission tuples. Based on our primary goal of minimizing the . Generalize rule r by adding some formulas from cc to its constraint and eliminating conjuncts for attributes used in those formulas. f½x 7 ! y denotes a copy of function f modified so that fðxÞ ¼ y. a½i:: denotes the suffix of array a starting at index i. generated policy's WSC, and a secondary preference for rules with more constraints, we define Q rul ðr; UPÞ ¼ hj r ½ ½ \ UPj=WSCðrÞ; jconðrÞji:
The secondary preference for more constraints is a heuristic, based on the observation that rules with more constraints tend to be more general than other rules with the same j r ½ ½ \ UPj=WSCðrÞ (such rules typically have more conjuncts) and hence lead to lower WSC. In generalizeRule, uncovUP is the second argument to Q rul , so r ½ ½ \ UP is the set of user-permission tuples in UP 0 that are covered by r and not covered by rules already in the policy. The loop over i near the end of the pseudocode for generalizeRule considers all possibilities for the first atomic constraint in cc that gets added to the constraint of r. The function calls itself recursively to determine the subsequent atomic constraints in c that get added to the constraint.
The function mergeRulesðRulesÞ in Fig. 4 attempts to reduce the WSC of Rules by removing redundant rules and merging pairs of rules. A rule r in Rules is redundant if Rules contains another rule r 0 such that r ½ ½ r 0 ½ ½ . Informally, rules r 1 and r 2 are merged by taking, for each attribute, the union of the conjuncts in r 1 and r 2 for that attribute. If the resulting rule r merge is valid, r merge is added to Rules, and r 1 and r 2 and any other rules that are now redundant are removed from Rules. mergeRulesðRulesÞ updates its argument Rules in place, and it returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules were merged.
The function simplifyRulesðRulesÞ attempts to simplify all of the rules in Rules. It updates its argument Rules in place, replacing rules in Rules with simplified versions when simplification succeeds. It returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules were simplified. It attempts to simplify each rule in the following ways. (1) It eliminates sets that are supersets of other sets in conjuncts for multi-valued user attributes. The -based semantics for such conjuncts implies that this does not change the meaning of the conjunct. For example, a conjunct ffag; fa; bgg is simplified to ffagg. (2) It eliminates elements from sets in conjuncts for multi-valued user attributes when this preserves validity of the rule; note that this might increase but cannot decrease the meaning of a rule. For example, if every user whose specialties include a also have specialty b, and a rule contains the conjunct ffa; bgg for the specialties attribute, then b will be eliminated from that conjunct. (3) It eliminates conjuncts from a rule when this preserves validity of the rule. Since removing one conjunct might prevent removal of another conjunct, it searches for the set of conjuncts to remove that maximizes the quality of the resulting rule, while preserving validity. The user can specify a set of unremovable attributes, i.e., attributes for which simplifyRules should not try to eliminate the conjunct, because eliminating it would increase the risk of generating an overly general policy, i.e., a policy that might grant inappropriate permissions when new users or new resources (hence new permissions) are added to the system. Our experience suggests that appropriate unremovable attributes can be identified based on the obvious importance of some attributes and by examination of the policy generated without specification of unremovable attributes. (4) It eliminates atomic constraints from a rule when this preserves validity of the rule. It searches for the set of atomic constraints to remove that maximizes the quality of the resulting rule, while preserving validity. (5) It eliminates overlapping values between rules. Specifically, a value v in the conjunct for a user attribute a in a rule r is removed if there is another rule r 0 in the policy such that (i) attrðuaeðr 0 ÞÞ attrðuaeðrÞÞ and attrðraeðr 0 ÞÞ attrðraeðrÞÞ, (ii) the conjunct of uaeðr 0 Þ for a contains v, (iii) each conjunct of uaeðr 0 Þ or raeðr 0 Þ other than the conjunct for a is either > or a superset of the corresponding conjunct of r, and (iv) conðr 0 Þ conðrÞ. The condition for removal of a value in the conjunct for a resource attribute is analogous. If a conjunct of uaeðrÞ or raeðrÞ becomes empty, r is removed from the policy. For example, if a policy contains the rules hdept 2 fd 1 ; d 2 g^position ¼ p 1 ; type ¼ t 1 ; read; dept ¼ depti and hdept 2 fd 1 g^position ¼ p 1 ; type 2 ft 1 ; t 2 g; read; dept ¼ depti, then d 1 is eliminated from the former rule. (6) It eliminates overlapping operations between rules. The details are similar to those for elimination of overlapping values between rules. For example, if a policy contains the rules hdept ¼ d 1 ; type ¼ t 1 ; read; dept ¼ depti and hdept ¼ d 1^p osition ¼ p 1 ; type ¼ t 1 ; fread; writeg; dept ¼ depti, then read is eliminated from the latter rule.
Asymptotic running time. The algorithm's overall running time is worst-case cubic in jUP 0 j. A detailed analysis of the asymptotic running time appears in Section 9 in the Supplemental Material, available online. In the experiments with sample policies and synthetic policies described in Section 5, the observed running time is roughly quadratic and roughly linear, respectively, in jUP 0 j.
Attribute selection. Attribute data may contain attributes irrelevant to access control. This potentially hurts the effectiveness and performance of policy mining algorithms [9] , [10] . Therefore, before applying our algorithm to a data set that might contain irrelevant attributes, it is advisable to use the method in [9] or [11] to determine the relevance of each attribute to the user-permission assignment and then eliminate attributes with low relevance.
Processing order. The order in which tuples and rules are processed can affect the mined policy. The order in which our algorithm processes tuples and rules is described in Section 10 in the Supplemental Material, available online.
Optimizations. Our implementation incorporates a few optimizations not reflected in the pseudocode but described in Section 11 in the Supplemental Material, available online. The most novel optimization is that rules are merged (by calling mergeRules) periodically, not only after all of UP 0 has been covered. This is beneficial because merging sometimes has the side-effect of generalization, which causes more user-permission tuples to be covered without explicitly considering them as seeds.
Noise Detection
In practice, the given user-permission relation often contains noise, consisting of over-assignments and underassignments. An over-assignment is when a permission is inappropriately granted to a user. An under-assignment is when a user lacks a permission that he or she should be granted. Noise incurs security risks and significant IT support effort [11] . This section describes extensions of our algorithm to handle noise. The extended algorithm detects and reports suspected noise and generates an ABAC policy that is consistent with its notion of the correct user-permission relation (i.e., with the suspected noise removed). The user should examine the suspected noise and decide which parts of it are actual noise (i.e., errors in the userpermission relation). If all of it is actual noise, then the policy already generated is the desired one; otherwise, the user should remove the parts that are actual noise from the user-permission relation to obtain a correct user-permission relation and then run the algorithm without the noise detection extension on it to generate the desired ABAC policy.
Over-assignments are often the result of incomplete revocation of old permissions when users change job functions [11] . Therefore, over-assignments usually cannot be captured concisely using rules with attribute expressions that refer to the current attribute information, so a candidate rule constructed from a user-permission tuple that is an over-assignment is less likely to be generalized and merged with other rules, and that candidate rule will end up as a low-quality rule in the generated policy. So, to detect over-assignments, we introduce a rule quality threshold t. The rule quality metric used here is the first component of the metric used in the loop in Fig. 1 that constructs Rules 0 ; thus, t is a threshold on the value of Q rul ðr; uncovUPÞ, and the rules with quality less than or equal to t form a suffix of the sequence of rules added to Rules 0 . The extended algorithm reports as suspected over-assignments the user-permission tuples covered in Rules 0 only by rules with quality less than or equal to t, and then it removes rules with quality less than or equal to t from Rules 0 . Adjustment of t is guided by the user. For example, the user might guess a percentage of over-assignments (e.g., 3 percent) based on experience, and let the system adjust t until the number of reported over-assignments is that percentage of jUP 0 j.
To detect under-assignments, we look for rules that are almost valid, i.e., rules that would be valid if a relatively small number of tuples were added to UP 0 . A parameter a quantifies the notion of "relatively small". A rule is a almost valid if the fraction of invalid user-permission tuples in r ½ ½ is at most a, i.e., j r ½ ½ n UP 0 j Ä j r ½ ½ j a. In places where the policy mining algorithm checks whether a rule is valid, if the rule is a almost valid, the algorithm treats it as if it were valid. The extended algorithm reports S r2Rules 0 r ½ ½ n UP 0 as the set of suspected under-assignments, and (as usual) it returns Rules 0 as the generated policy. Adjustment of a is guided by the user, similarly as for the over-assignment threshold t.
EVALUATION
The general methodology used for evaluation is described in Section 1. We applied this methodology to sample policies and synthetic policies. Evaluation on policies (including attribute data) from real organizations would be ideal, but we are not aware of any suitable and publicly available policies from real organizations. Therefore, we developed sample policies that, although not based directly on specific real-world case studies, are intended to be similar to policies that might be found in the application domains for which they are named. The sample policies are relatively small and intended to resemble interesting core parts of full-scale policies in those application domains. Despite their modest size, they are a significant test of the effectiveness of our algorithm, because they express non-trivial policies and exercise all features of our policy language, including use of set membership and superset relations in attribute expressions and constraints. The synthetic policies are used primarily to assess the behavior of the algorithm as a function of parameters controlling specific structural characteristics of the policies.
We implemented our policy mining algorithm in Java and ran experiments on a laptop with a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU. All of the code and data is available at http:// www.cs.stonybrook.edu/~stoller/. In our experiments, the weights w i in the definition of WSC equal 1.
Evaluation on Sample Policies
We developed four sample policies, each consisting of rules and a manually written attribute data set containing a small number of instances of each type of user and resource. We also generated synthetic attribute data sets for each sample policy. The sample policies are described very briefly in this section. Details of the sample policies, including all policy rules, some illustrative manually written attribute data, and a more detailed description of the synthetic attribute data generation algorithm appear in Section 12 in the Supplemental Material, available online. Although the sample policies are relatively small when measured by a coarse metric such as number of rules, they are complex, because each rule has a lot of structure. For example, the number of well-formed rules built using the attributes and constants in each policy and that satisfy the strictest syntactic size limits satisfied by rules in the sample policies (at most one conjunct in each UAE, at most two conjuncts in each RAE, at most two atomic constraints in each constraint, at most one atomic value in each UAE conjunct, at most two atomic values in each RAE conjunct, etc.) is more than 10 12 for the sample policies with manually written attribute data and is much higher for the sample policies with synthetic attribute data and the synthetic policies.
In summary, our algorithm is very effective for all three sample policies: there are only small differences between the original and mined policies if no attributes are declared unremovable, and the original and mined policies are identical if the resource-type attribute is declared unremovable.
University sample policy. Our university sample policy controls access by students, instructors, teaching assistants, registrar officers, department chairs, and admissions officers to applications (for admission), gradebooks, transcripts, and course schedules. If no attributes are declared unremovable, the generated policy is the same as the original ABAC policy except that the RAE conjunct "type=transcript" is replaced with the constraint "department=department" in one rule. If resource type is declared unremovable, the generated policy is identical to the original ABAC policy.
Health care sample policy. Our health care sample policy controls access by nurses, doctors, patients, and agents (e.g., a patient's spouse) to electronic health records (HRs) and HR items (i.e., entries in health records). If no attributes are declared unremovable, the generated policy is the same as the original ABAC policy except that the RAE conjunct "type=HRitem" is eliminated from four rules; that conjunct is unnecessary, because those rules also contain a conjunct for the "topic" attribute, and the "topic" attribute is used only for resources with type=HRitem. If resource type is declared unremovable, the generated policy is identical to the original ABAC policy.
Project management sample policy. Our project management sample policy controls access by department managers, project leaders, employees, contractors, auditors, accountants, and planners to budgets, schedules, and tasks associated with projects. If no attributes are declared unremovable, the generated policy is the same as the original ABAC policy except that the RAE conjunct "type=task" is eliminated from three rules; the explanation is similar to the above explanation for the health care sample policy. If resource type is declared unremovable, the generated policy is identical to the original ABAC policy.
Running time on synthetic attribute data. We generated a series of pseudorandom synthetic attribute data sets for the sample policies, parameterized by a number N, which is the number of departments for the university and project management sample policies, and the number of wards for the health care sample policy. The generated attribute data for users and resources associated with each department or ward are similar to but more numerous than the attribute data in the manually written data sets. Fig. 5 contains information about the sizes of the policies with synthetic attribute data, for selected values of N. Policies for the largest shown value of N are generated as described in Section 12 in the Supplemental Material, available online; policies for smaller values of N are prefixes of them. Each row contains the average over 20 synthetic policies with the specified N. For all sizes of synthetic attribute data, the mined policies are the same as with the manually generated attribute data. This reflects that larger attribute data sets are not necessarily harder to mine from, if they represent more instances of the same rules; the complexity is primarily in the structure of the rules. Fig. 6 shows the algorithm's running time as a function of N. Each data point is an average of the running times on 20 policies with synthetic attribute data. Error bars (too small to see in most cases) show 95 percent confidence intervals using Student's t-distribution. The running time is a roughly quadratic function of N for all three sample policies, with different constant factors. Different constant factors are expected, because policies are very complex structures, and N captures only one aspect of the size and difficulty of the policy mining problem instance. For example, the constant factors are larger for the university sample policy mainly because it has larger jUPj, as a function of N, than the other sample policies. For example, Fig. 5 shows that jUPj for the university sample policy with N ¼ 10 is larger than jUPj for the other sample policies with N ¼ 20.
Benefit of periodic rule merging optimization. It is not obvious a priori whether the savings from periodic merging of Fig. 5 . Sizes of the sample policies. "Type" indicates whether the attribute data in the policy is manually written ("man") or synthetic ("syn"). N is the number of departments for the university and project management sample policies, and the number of wards for the health care sample policy. d j r ½ ½ j is the average number of user-permission tuples that satisfy each rule. An empty cell indicates the same value as the cell above it.
rules outweighs the cost. In fact, the net benefit grows with policy size. For example, for the university policy with synthetic attribute data, this optimization provides a speedup of (67 sec)/(40 sec) ¼ 1.7 for N dept ¼ 10 and a speedup of (1,012 sec)/(102 sec) ¼ 9.9 for N dept ¼ 15.
Evaluation on Synthetic Policies
We also evaluated our algorithm on synthetic ABAC policies. On the positive side, synthetic policies can be generated in all sizes and with varying structural characteristics. On the other hand, even though our synthesis algorithm is designed to generate policies with some realistic characteristics, the effectiveness and performance of our algorithm on synthetic policies might not be representative of its effectiveness and performance on real policies. For experiments with synthetic policies, we compare the syntactic similarity and WSC of the synthetic ABAC policy and the mined ABAC policy. Syntactic similarity of policies measures the syntactic similarity of rules in the policies. It ranges from 0 (completely different) to 1 (identical). The detailed definition of syntactic similarity is in Section 14 in the Supplemental Material, available online. We do not expect high syntactic similarity between the synthetic and mined ABAC policies, because synthetic policies tend to be unnecessarily complicated, and mined policies tend to be more concise. Thus, we consider the policy mining algorithm to be effective if the mined ABAC policy Rules mined is simpler (i.e., has lower WSC) than the original synthetic ABAC policy Rules syn . We compare them using the compression factor, defined as WSCðRules syn Þ=WSCðRules mined Þ. Thus, a compression factor above 1 is good, and larger is better.
Synthetic policy generation. Our policy synthesis algorithm first generates the rules and then uses the rules to guide generation of the attribute data; this allows control of the number of granted permissions. Our synthesis algorithm takes N rule , the desired number of rules, N min cnj , the minimum number of conjuncts in each attribute expression, and N min cns , the minimum number of constraints in each rule, as inputs. The numbers of users and resources are not specified directly but are proportional to the number of rules, since our algorithm generates new users and resources to satisfy each generated rule, as sketched below. Rule generation is based on several statistical distributions, which are either based loosely on our sample policies or assumed to have a simple functional form (e.g., uniform distribution or Zipf distribution). For example, the distribution of the number of conjuncts in each attribute expression is based loosely on our sample policies and ranges from N min cnj to N min cnj þ 3, the distribution of the number of atomic constraints in each constraint is based loosely on our sample policies and ranges from N min cns to N min cns þ 2, and the distribution of attributes in attribute expressions is assumed to be uniform (i.e., each attribute is equally likely to be selected for use in each conjunct).
The numbers of user attributes and resource attributes are fixed at N attr ¼ 8 (this is the maximum number of attributes relevant to access control for the data sets presented in [12] ). Our synthesis algorithm adopts a simple type system, with seven types, and with at least one user attribute and one resource attribute of each type. For each type t, the cardinality cðtÞ is selected from a uniform distribution on the interval ½2; 10N rule þ 2, the target ratio between the frequencies of the most and least frequent values of type t is chosen to be 1, 10, or 100 with probability 0.2 0.7, and 0.1, respectively, and a skew sðtÞ is computed so that the Zipf distribution with cardinality cðtÞ and skew sðtÞ has that frequency ratio. When assigning a value to an attribute of type t, the value is selected from the Zipf distribution with cardinality cðtÞ and skew sðtÞ. Types are also used when generating constraints: constraints relate attributes with the same type.
For each rule r, our algorithm ensures that there are at least N urp ¼ 16 user-resource pairs hu; ri such that hu; r; oi r for some operation o. The algorithm first checks how many pairs of an existing user and an existing resource (which were generated for previous rules) satisfy r or can be made to satisfy r by appropriate choice of values for attributes with unknown values (i.e., ?). If the count is less than N urp , the algorithm generates additional users and resources that together satisfy r. With the resulting modest number of users and resources, some conjuncts in the UAE and RAE are likely to be unnecessary (i.e., eliminating them does not grant additional permissions to any existing user). In a real policy with sufficiently large numbers of users and resources, all conjuncts are likely be to necessary. To emulate this situation with a modest number of users, for each rule r, for each conjunct e u ða u Þ in the UAE e u in r, the algorithm generates a user u 0 by copying an existing user u that (together with some resource) satisfies r and then changing d u ðu 0 ; a u Þ to some value not in e u ða u Þ. Similarly, the algorithm adds resources to increase the chance that conjuncts in resource attribute expressions are necessary, and it adds users and resources to increase the chance that constraints are necessary. The algorithm initially assigns values only to the attributes needed to ensure that a user or resource satisfies the rule under consideration. To make the attribute data more realistic, a final step of the algorithm assigns values to additional attributes until the fraction of attribute values equal to ? reaches a target fraction n ? ¼ 0:1.
Results for varying number of conjuncts. To explore the effect of varying the number of conjuncts, we generated synthetic policies with N rule ranging from 10 to 50 in steps of 20, with N min cnj ranging from 4 to 0, and with N min cns ¼ 0. For each value of N rule , synthetic policies with smaller N min cnj are obtained by removing conjuncts from synthetic policies with larger N min cnj . For each combination of parameter values (in these experiments and the experiments with varying number of constraints and varying overlap between rules), we generate 50 synthetic policies and average the results. Some experimental results appear in Fig. 7 . For each value of N rule , as the number of conjuncts decreases, jUPj increases (because the numbers of users and resources satisfying each rule increase), the syntactic similarity increases (because as there are fewer conjuncts in each rule in the synthetic policy, it is more likely that the remaining conjuncts are important and will also appear in the mined policy), and the compression factor decreases (because as the policies get more similar, the compression factor must get closer to 1). For example, for N rule ¼ 50, as N min cnj decreases from 4 to 0, average jUPj increases from 1,975 to 11,969, average syntactic similarity increases from 0.62 to 0.75, and average compression factor decreases from 1.75 to 0.84. The figure also shows the density of the policies, where the density of a policy is defined as jUPj Ä ðjUj Â jP jÞ, where the set of granted permissions is P ¼ S hu;r;oi2UP fhr; oig. The average densities all fall within the range of densities seen in the nine real-world data sets shown in [13, Table 1 ], namely, 0.003 to 0.19. Density is a decreasing function of N rule , because jUPj, jUj, and jP j each grow roughly linearly as functions of N rule . The standard deviations of some quantities are relatively large in some cases, but, as the relatively small confidence intervals indicate, this is due to the intrinsic variability of the synthetic policies generated by our algorithm, not due to insufficient samples.
Results for varying number of constraints. To explore the effect of varying the number of constraints, we generated synthetic policies with N rule ranging from 10 to 50 in steps of 20, with N min cns ranging from 2 to 0, and with N min cnj ¼ 0. For each value of N rule , policies with smaller N min cns are obtained by removing constraints from synthetic policies with larger N min cns . Some experimental results appear in Fig. 8 . For each value of N rule , as the number of constraints decreases, jUPj increases (because the numbers of users and resources satisfying each rule increase), syntactic similarity decreases (because our algorithm gives preference to constraints over conjuncts, so when N min cns is small, the mined policy tends to have more constraints and fewer conjuncts than the synthetic policy), and the compression factor decreases (because the additional constraints in the mined policy cause each rule in the mined policy to cover fewer user-permission tuples on average, increasing the number of rules and hence the WSC). For example, for N rule ¼ 50, as N min cns decreases from 2 to 0, average jUPj increases from 3,560 to 26,472, average syntactic similarity decreases slightly from 0.67 to 0.64, and average compression factor decreases from 1.29 to 0.96.
Results for varying overlap between rules. We also explored the effect of varying overlap between rules, to test our conjecture that policies with more overlap between rules are harder to reconstruct through policy mining. The overlap between rules r 1 and r 2 is r 1 ½ ½ \ r 2 ½ ½ . To increase the average overlap between pairs of rules in a synthetic policy, we extended the policy generation algorithm so that, after generating each rule r, with probability P over the algorithm generates another rule r 0 obtained from r by randomly removing one conjunct from uaeðrÞ and adding one conjunct (generated in the usual way) to raeðrÞ; typically, r and r 0 have a significant amount of overlap. We also add users and resources that together satisfy r 0 , so that r 0 ½ ½ 6 r ½ ½ , otherwise r 0 is redundant. This construction is based on a pattern that occurs a few times in our sample policies. We Fig. 7 . Experimental results for synthetic policies with varying N min cnj . "Synt. Sim." is syntactic similarity. "Compression" is the compression factor. m is mean, s is standard deviation, and CI is half-width of 95 percent confidence interval using Student's t-distribution. An empty cell indicates the same value as the cell above it. generated synthetic policies with 30 rules, using the extended algorithm described above. For each value of N rule , we generated synthetic policies with P over ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.25, and with N min cnj = 2 and N min cns = 0. Some experimental results appear in Fig. 9 . For each value of N rule , as P over increases, the syntactic similarity decreases (because our algorithm effectively removes overlap, i.e., produces policies with relatively little overlap), and the compression factor increases (because removal of more overlap makes the mined policy more concise). For example, for N rule ¼ 50, as P over increases from 0 to 1, the syntactic similarity decreases slightly from 0.74 to 0.71, and the compression factor increases from 1.16 to 1.23.
Generalization
A potential concern with optimization-based policy mining algorithms is that the mined policies might overfit the given data and hence not be robust, i.e., not generalize well, in the sense that the policy requires modifications to accommodate new users. To evaluate how well policies generated by our algorithm generalize, we applied the following methodology, based on [9] . The inputs to the methodology are an ABAC policy mining algorithm, an ABAC policy p, and a fraction f (informally, f is the fraction of the data used for training); the output is a fraction e called the generalization error of the policy mining algorithm on policy p for fraction f. Given a set U 0 of users and a policy p, the associated resources for U 0 are the resources r such that p grants some user in U 0 some permission on r. To compute the generalization error, repeat the following procedure 10 times and average the results: randomly select a subset U 0 of the user set U of p with jU 0 j=jUj ¼ f, randomly select a subset R 0 of the associated resources for U 0 with jR 0 j=jRj ¼ f, generate an ACL policy p ACL containing only the permissions for users in U 0 for resources in R 0 , apply the policy mining algorithm to p ACL with the attribute data to generate an ABAC policy p gen , compute the generalization error as the fraction of incorrectly assigned permissions for users not in U 0 and resources not in R 0 , i.e., as jS É S 0 j=jSj, where S ¼ fhu; r; oi 2 ½½p j u 2 U n U 0^r 2 R n R 0 g, S 0 ¼ fhu; r; oi 2 p 0 ½ ½ j u 2 U n U 0^r 2 R n R 0 g, and É is symmetric set difference.
We measured generalization error for f from 0.1 to 0.5 in steps of 0.05 for the university (with N dept ¼ 40), health care (with N ward ¼ 40), and project management (with N dept ¼ 40) sample policies. For the university and health care sample policies, the generalization error is zero in all these cases. For the project management sample policy, the generalization error is 0.11 at f ¼ 0:1, drops roughly linearly to zero at f ¼ 0:35, and remains zero thereafter. There are no other existing ABAC policy mining algorithms, so a direct comparison of the generalization results from our algorithm with generalization results from algorithms based on other approaches, e.g., probabilistic models, is not currently possible. Nevertheless, these results are promising and suggest that policies generated by our algorithm generalize reasonably well.
Noise
Permission noise. To evaluate the effectiveness of our noise detection techniques in the presence of permission noise, we started with an ABAC policy, generated an ACL policy, added noise, and applied our policy mining algorithm to the resulting policy. To add a specified level n of permission noise, measured as a percentage of jUP 0 j, we added njUP 0 j=6 under-assignments and 5njUP 0 j=6 over-assignments to the ACL policy generated from the ABAC policy. This ratio is based on the ratio of Type I and Type II errors in [11, Table 1 ]. The over-assignments are user-permission tuples generated by selecting the user, resource, and operation from categorical distributions with approximately normally distributed probabilities ("approximately" because the normal distribution is truncated on the sides to have the appropriate finite domain); we adopted this approach from [11] . The under-assignments are removals of user-permission tuples generated in the same way. For each noise level, we ran our policy mining algorithm with noise detection inside a loop that searched for the best values of a (considering values between 0:01 and 0:09 in steps of :01) and t (considering 0.08, values between 0.1 and 0.9 in steps of 0.1, and between 1 and 10 in steps of 1), because we expect t to depend on the noise level, and we want to simulate an experienced administrator, so that the results reflect the capabilities and limitations of the noise detection technique rather than the administrator. The best values of a and t are the ones that maximize the Jaccard similarity of the actual (injected) noise and the reported noise. ROC curves that illustrate the trade-off between false positives and false negatives when tuning the values of a and t appear in Section 15 in the Supplemental Material, available online.
We started with the university (with N dept ¼ 4), health care (with N ward ¼ 6), and project management (with N dept ¼ 6) sample policies with synthetic attribute data (we also did some experiments with larger policy instances and got similar results), and with synthetic policies with N rule ¼ 20. Fig. 10 shows the Jaccard similarity of the actual and reported over-assignments and the Jaccard similarity of the actual and reported under-assignments. Note that, for a policy mining algorithm without noise detection (hence the reported noise is the empty set), these Jaccard similarities would be 0. Each data point is an average over 10 policies, and error bars (too small to see in some cases, and omitted when the standard deviation is 0) show 95 percent confidence intervals using Student's t-distribution. Over-assignment detection is accurate, with average Jaccard similarity always 0.94 or higher (in our experiments). Under-assignment detection is very good for university and project management, with average Jaccard similarity always 0.93 or higher, but less accurate for health care and synthetic policies, with average Jaccard similarity always 0.63 or higher. Intuitively, detecting over-assignments is somewhat easier, because it is unlikely that there are high-quality rules that cover the over-assignments, so we mostly get rules that do not over-assign and hence the over-assignments get classified correctly. However, under-assignments are more likely to affect the generated rules, leading to mis-classification of under-assignments. As a function of noise level in the considered range, the Jaccard similarities are flat in some cases and generally trend slightly downward in other cases. Fig. 11 shows the semantic similarity of the original and mined policies. Note that, for a policy mining algorithm without noise detection, the semantic similarity would equal 1 À n. With our algorithm, the semantic similarity is always significantly better than this. The average semantic similarity is always 0.98 or higher, even for n ¼ 0:12. The similarities are generally lower for synthetic policies than sample policies, as expected, because synthetic policies are not reconstructed as well even in the absence of noise.
Permission noise and attribute noise. To evaluate the effectiveness of our noise detection techniques in the presence of permission noise and attribute noise, we performed experiments in which, for a given noise level n, we added njUP 0 j=7 under-assignments, 5njUP 0 j=7 over-assignments, and njUP 0 j=7 permission errors due to attribute errors to the ACL policy generated from the ABAC policy (in other words, we add attribute errors until njUP 0 j=7 user-permission tuples have been added or removed due to attribute errors; this way, attribute errors are measured on the same scale as under-assignments and over-assignments). The attribute errors are divided equally between missing values (i.e., replace a non-bottom value with bottom) and incorrect values (i.e., replace a non-bottom value with another nonbottom value). Our current techniques do not attempt to distinguish permission noise from attribute noise (this is a topic for future research); policy analysts are responsible for determining whether a reported suspected error is due to an incorrect permission, an incorrect or missing attribute value, or a false alarm. Since our techniques report only suspected under-assignments and suspected over-assignments, when comparing actual noise to reported noise, permission changes due to attribute noise (i.e., changes in the set of user-permission tuples that satisfy the original policy rules) are included in the actual noise. We started with the same policies as above. Graphs of Jaccard similarity of actual and reported noise, and syntactic similarity of original and mined policies, appear in Section 16 in the Supplemental Material, available online. The results are similar to those without attribute noise, except with slightly lower similarities for the same fraction of permission errors. This shows that our approach to noise detection remains appropriate in the presence of combined attribute noise and permission noise.
Comparison with Inductive Logic Programming
We implemented a translation from ABAC policy mining to inductive logic programming (ILP) and applied Progol [14] , [15] , a well-known ILP system developed by Stephen Muggleton, to translations of our sample policies and synthetic policies. Details of the translation appear in Section 17 in the Supplemental Material, available online. Progol mostly succeeds in reconstructing the policies for university and project management, except it fails to learn rules with conjuncts or operation sets containing multiple constants, instead producing multiple rules. In addition, Progol fails to reconstruct two rules in the health care sample policy. Due to Progol's failure to learn rules with conjuncts or operation sets containing multiple constants, we generated a new set of 20 synthetic policies with at most one constant per conjunct and one operation per rule. On these policies with N rule ¼ 5, our algorithm achieves a compression factor of 1.92, compared to 1.67 for Progol.
Progol is much slower than our algorithm. For the university (with N dept ¼ 10), health care (with N ward ¼ 20), and project management (with N dept ¼ 20) sample policies, Progol is 302, 375, and 369 times slower than our algorithm, respectively. For synthetic policies with N rule ¼ 5, Progol is 2.74 times slower than our algorithm; for synthetic policies with N rule ¼ 10, we stopped Progol after several hours.
RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm in this paper is the first policy mining algorithm for any ABAC framework. Existing algorithms for access control policy mining produce role-based policies; this includes algorithms that use attribute data, e.g., [7] , [16] , [17] . Algorithms for mining meaningful RBAC policies from ACLs and user attribute data [7] , [17] attempt to produce RBAC policies that are small (i.e., have low WSC) and contain roles that are meaningful in the sense that the role's user membership is close to the meaning of some user attribute expression. User names (i.e., values of uid) are used in role membership definitions and hence are not used in attribute expressions, so some sets of users cannot be characterized exactly by a user attribute expression. The resulting role-based policies are often much larger than attribute-based policies, due to the lack of parameterization; for example, they require separate roles for each department in an organization, in cases where a single rule suffices in an attribute-based policy. Furthermore, algorithms for mining meaningful roles does not consider resource attributes (or permission attributes), constraints, or set relationships.
Xu and Stoller's work on mining parameterized RBAC (PRBAC) policies [18] is more closely related. Their PRBAC framework supports a simple form of ABAC, because users and permissions have attributes that are implicit parameters of roles, the set of users assigned to a role is specified by an expression over user attributes, and the set of permissions granted to a role is specified by an expression over permission attributes. Our work differs from theirs in both the policy framework and the algorithm. Regarding the policy framework, our ABAC framework supports a richer form of ABAC than their PRBAC framework does. Most importantly, our framework supports multi-valued (also called "set-valued") attributes and allows attributes to be compared using set membership, subset, and equality; their PRBAC framework does not support multi-valued attributes, and it allows attributes to be compared using only equality. Multi-valued attributes are very important in real policies. Due to the lack of multi-valued attributes, the sample policies in [18] contain artificial limitations, e.g., a faculty teaches only one course, and a doctor is a member of only one medical team. Our sample policies are extensions of their case studies without these limitations: a faculty may teach multiple courses, a doctor may be a member of multiple medical teams, etc. Our algorithm works in a different, and more efficient, way than theirs. Our algorithm directly constructs rules to include in the output. Their algorithm constructs a large set of candidate roles and then determines which roles to include in the output, possibly discarding many candidates (more than 90 percent for their sample policies).
Ni et al. investigated the use of machine learning algorithms for security policy mining [10] . Specifically, they use supervised machine learning algorithms to learn classifiers that associate permissions with roles, given as input the permissions, the roles, attribute data for the permissions, and (as training data) the role-permission assignment. The resulting classifier-a support vector machine (SVM)-can be used to automate assignment of new permissions to roles. They also consider a similar scenario in which a supervised machine learning algorithm is used to learn classifiers that associate users with roles, given as input the users, the roles, user attribute data, and the user-role assignment. The resulting classifiers are analogous to attribute expressions, but there are many differences between their work and ours. The largest difference is that their approach needs to be given the roles and the role-permission or userrole assignment as training data; in contrast, our algorithm does not require any part of the desired high-level policy to be given as input. Also, their work does not consider anything analogous to constraints, but it could be extended to do so. Exploring ABAC policy mining algorithms based on machine learning is a direction for future work.
Lim investigated the use of evolutionary algorithms to learn and evolve security policies policies [19] . They consider several problems, including difficult problems related to risk-based policies, but not general ABAC policy mining. In the facet of their work most similar to ABAC policy mining, they showed that genetic programming can learn the access condition in the Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model for mandatory access control. The learned predicate was sometimes syntactically more complex than, but logically equivalent to, the desired predicate.
Association rule mining has been studied extensively. Seminal work includes Agrawal and Srikant's algorithm for mining propositional rules [20] . Association rule mining algorithms are not well suited to ABAC policy mining, because they are designed to find rules that are probabilistic in nature [20] and are supported by statistically strong evidence. They are not designed to produce a set of rules that are strictly satisfied, that completely cover the input data, and are minimum-sized among such sets of rules. Consequently, unlike our algorithm, they do not give preference to smaller rules or rules with less overlap (to reduce overall policy size).
Bauer et al. use association rule mining to detect policy errors [21] . They apply propositional association rule mining to access logs to learn rules expressing that a user who exercised certain permissions is likely to exercise another permission. A suspected misconfiguration exists if a user who exercised the former permissions does not have the latter permission. Bauer et al. do not consider attribute data or generate entire policies.
Inductive logic programming is a form of machine learning in which concepts are learned from examples and expressed as logic programs. ABAC policies can be represented as logic programs, so ABAC policy mining can be seen as a special case of ILP. However, ILP systems are not ideally suited to ABAC policy mining. ILP is a more difficult problem, which involves learning incompletely specified relations from a limited number of positive and negative examples, exploiting background knowledge, etc. ILP algorithms are correspondingly more complicated and less scalable, and focus more on how much to generalize from the given examples than on optimization of logic program size. For example, Progol (cf. Section 5.5) uses a compression (rule size) metric to guide construction of each rule but does not attempt to achieve good compression for the learned rules collectively; in particular, it does not perform steps analogous to merging rules, eliminating overlap between rules, and selecting the highest-quality candidate rules for the final solution. As the experiments in Section 5.5 demonstrate, Progol is slower and generally produces policies with higher WSC, compared to our algorithm.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents an ABAC policy mining algorithm. Experiments with sample policies and synthetic policies demonstrate the algorithm's effectiveness. Directions for future work include supporting additional ABAC policy language features and exploring use of machine learning for ABAC policy mining.
